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In Memoriam 
 
Robert Solomon Wistrich 
 
1945–2015 
 
It is with great sadness that we must record here the passing of Professor 
Robert Wistrich on May 19, 2015 in Rome, where he had been invited to 
address the Italian Parliament. 
 Robert Wistrich had a distinguished career, bringing out important studies 
on Austrian Jewry, the Holocaust, and on the history and current reality of 
antisemitism. He held the Neuberger Chair for Modern European History at 
the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; and was head of the Vidal Sassoon 
Internatioal Center for the Study of Antisemitism from 2002 to 2015. 
 Born in Kazakhstan in 1945, Prof. Wistrich’s family returned to Poland 
after World War II, later moving to France, and then settling in England, 
where he grew up. At age 17, he won an Open Scholarship to Cambridge 
University, where he received his BA and MA degrees. His Ph.D. was 
awarded by the University of London in 1974. 
 Along with his academic career, Prof. Wistrich was an advisor for a 
number of documentaries and films, including the Thames Television 3-part 
series, The Longest Hatred (1993, directed by Rex Bloomstein), which 
provided a historical overview of anti-Jewish persecution; the BBC’s 
Blaming the Jews (2003) about present-day Muslim antisemitism; and for 
Obsession: Radical Islam’s War against the West (2006). He served from 
1999 until 2001 as one of six scholars appointed to a special international 
Catholic-Jewish historical commission to review the wartime record of Pope 
Pius XII. He also served as a rapporteur on antisemitism and related issues 
for the U.S. Department of State, the Organisation for Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe (Strasbourg), and the United 
Nations Commission on Antisemitism and Human Rights and the Human 
Rights Commission in Geneva. 
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 Among his notable publications were Socialism and the Jews (American 
Jewish Committee Award, 1985), The Jews of Vienna in the Age of Franz 
Joseph (Austrian State Prize for Danubian History, 1989), Antisemitism: The 
Longest Hatred (1991, H. H. Wingate Prize for Non-Fiction, UK), Hitler and 
the Holocaust (2003); Laboratory for World Destruction: Germans and Jews 
in Central Europe (2007); and From Ambivalence to Betrayal: The Left, the 
Jews, and Israel (2012). His monumental study of antisemitism, A Lethal 
Obsession: Antisemitism from Antiquity to the Global Jihad, appeared in 
2010 and was named Best Book of the Year by the Journal for the Study of 
Antisemitism. He was editor of Holocaust Denial: The Politics of Perfidy 
(2012), and of the present volume, Anti-Judaism, Antisemitism, and the 
Delegitimization of Israel. 
 On behalf of the Simon Wiestenthal Center, Prof. Wistrich wrote the text 
to accompany the exhibit “People, Book, Land: The 3500 Year Relationship 
of the Jewish People with the Holy Land” which was first displayed at 
UNESCO Headquarters, Paris in 2014, and afterwards in other venues. It was 
a project of particular interest to him as an advocate for the Jewish people 
and Israel. 
 
Working with Prof. Wistrich at the Vidal Sassoon Center was a great 
privilege. We appreciated his expertise and his example of dedication and 
determination. His wide knowledge of European and world history made a 
great impression on those of us who worked closely with him, and his sense 
of humor and personal anecdotes made cooperation in his many projects a 
pleasure. He will be greatly missed, and it is hoped that this final volume 
which he edited will be part of his lasting legacy. 
 
 The Vidal Sassoon International Center 
 for the Study of Antisemitism 
 Jerusalem, May 2016 
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 Preface 
The articles contained in this volume on Anti-Judaism, Antisemitism, and 
Delegitimizing Israel are representative of the discussions that were part of a 
conference held at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in May 2014. The 
current collection is not a presentation of the papers given, but rather are 
essays requested by Professor Robert Wistrich which illustrate many aspects 
of the current surge in anti-Jewish and anti-Israel rhetoric and violence. 
Contributors to this volume include academics, independent researchers, 
journalists, political scientists, and representatives of Jewish organizations. It 
should be noted that the views presented in these papers are those of the 
authors, and do not represent the Vidal Sassoon International Center for the 
Study of Antisemitism, which is a non-political research institute. 
 Ben Cohen’s opening essay points to the hyperawareness of Jews world-
wide to threats of antisemitic violence. Yet he points out that: 
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when modern antisemitism 
crystallized, the Jewish experience of it was defined by three factors: 
first, the existence of discriminatory legislation; second, a marked 
tendency towards mass violence, either sanctioned, or colluded in, by 
the state and the authorities; and third, the absence of Jewish 
sovereignty, which meant that Jews as minority communities were 
dependent for their security upon the states in which they lived. 
Early Zionist thinkers had perhaps naively suggested that with sovereignty, 
anti-Jewish persecution would end, yet anti-Zionism became one form of the 
“new” antisemitism. Jews themselves contributed to the demonization of 
Zionism, a history described in detail in Robert Wistrich’s essay, “Anti-
Zionism: From Critique to Delegitimization.” Exploring this theme further, 
Alvin H. Rosenfeld asks, “What Exactly is ‘Criticism of Israel’?” and Joel 
Fishmen examines “Anti-Zionism as Political Warfare.” 
 Other writers in this volume look at specific areas of the world in which 
anti-Jewish rhetoric, activism (as with the Boycott, Divest, and Sanction 
movement), and deadly violence have taken place. Melanie Phillips, Bat 
Ye’or, Manfred Gerstenfeld, and Lesley Klaff review the situation in Europe, 
citing specific cases. R. Amy Elman points up the failure of the European 
Union to deal effectively with antisemitism. Maurice Samuels and Michel 
Gurfinkiel focus on France. Milton Shain reviews the situation in South 
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Africa; Matthias Küntzel brings his expertise on Iran, and Efrat Aviv takes a 
look at the situation in Turkey manifested during the 2014 Gaza war. Samuel 
Barnai provides valuable insight into three trends in the Former Soviet 
Union, including the influence of Alexander Dugin and his “Eurasian 
Project” on the thinking of Vladimir Putin. On a more optimistic note, 
Laurence Weinbaum reviews the recent history of Poland, yet he, too, adds a 
cautionary note in his postscript. 
 Two writers focus on historical issues: Stephen H. Norwood looks back to 
the radical rhetoric of figures from both the far left and far right in the United 
States, showing the convergence of their anti-Jewish and anti-Israel thinking. 
Guy Millière provides an overview up to the present of the nationalist and 
Islamic trends that emerged in the Muslim world, which by the nineteenth 
century seemed to be on the verge of collapse in the face of the expansion of 
Western influence throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. 
 Efraim Sicher and Clemens Heni examine the prevalence of anti-Jewish 
and anti-Zionist thinking in academia. Sicher describes the peculiar inversion 
within postcolonial theory that has come to see Jews, formerly the 
quintessential “Other” of European society, as Judeo-Christian oppressors, 
and notes that: 
Postcolonial theory forms the basis for much academic work and 
teaching nowadays, and it enters the classroom as an agent of political 
activism. 
Clemens Heni, writing from Germany, points to the phenomenon of pro-
Hitler statements heard at public rallies in the wake of the Gaza war of July 
2014: 
They have fused seamlessly with radical left-wing anti-Zionism, 
Islamist Jew-hatred, and the inversion of the Holocaust. At the same 
time in academia we find a growing relativization, minimization, and 
reductionism when it comes to the Holocaust and the evaluation of 
Nazi antisemitism. . . . Moreover, this is happening at a time when the 
defamation of Israel and Zionism is itself being normalized—a 
dangerous combination particularly visible in the academic world. 
 Nelly Las looks at the subject from the perspective of feminism and 
gender studies. 
 Shimon Samuels and Giovanni Matteo Quer address the issue of identity 
theft by Palestinian propagandists. Shimon Samuels takes note of Palestinian 
propaganda efforts to deny any Jewish connection to Israel and Jewish holy 
place. Giovanni Matteo Quer focuses on the religious dimension of 
Palestinian replacement theology, in which it is now claimed that Jesus was 
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xi
an oppressed Palestinian―and this at a time when many Christian 
denominations are renewing their interest in the very Jewishness of Jesus. 
 Concluding this volume is Robert Wistrich’s essay on “Gaza, Hamas, and 
the “New” Antisemitism,” in which he demonstrates the thread that links the 
vicious anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist rhetoric found in radical Islamist 
preaching and the current jihad in Europe that targets not only Jews but 
European institutions as well. 
 Thus, this volume offers a variety of viewpoints and insights into current 
disturbing trends worldwide, providing a basis for further discussion and 
efforts to counter the increasingly vocal and violent hatred of Jews and Israel. 
 
 Alifa Saadya 
 Publications 
 The Vidal Sassoon International Center 
 for the Study of Antisemitism 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Antisemitism in the Age 
of Jewish Empowerment 
Ben Cohen 
INTRODUCTION 
The fact that antisemitism continues to exercise such an agonizing hold upon 
the collective imagination of Jewish communities today stems as much from 
the memories of the past as the experiences of the present. At the level of 
pure emotion, it seems inconceivable, less than a century after the Holocaust, 
that Jews should once again face mass violence, or be subjected to the kinds 
of wild calumnies that afflicted those generations who lived prior to 1945. 
Hence, there is an understandable tendency to filter reports of present-day 
episodes—a baying mob assaulting a synagogue in Paris,1 a series of bricks 
lobbed through the windows of a Dutch rabbi’s home2—through the images 
and narratives accumulated by Jewish history. Consequently, an attack on a 
Jewish individual or institution never seems like an isolated instance, but 
another link in a chain without end, defying understanding and thereby fuel-
ing the common description of antisemitism as “irrational”—a word that is 
simultaneously comforting and devoid of meaningful insight. 
 These acute Jewish sensitivities are exacerbated by two factors. Firstly, the 
awareness that antisemitism is truly an international phenomenon, manifest-
ing in countries as culturally different as, for example, Venezuela and Iran, 
yet incorporating similar thematic obsessions in both. The ease with which 
antisemitic sentiment in different locations can be instantly publicized and 
shared, by uploading texts, still images, and videos onto social media plat-
forms, merely bolsters this sense of a threat that is immediate and global. 
 Secondly, there is the discursive aspect of today’s antisemitism, which fre-
quently strikes at Jewish collective memory through word and picture asso-
ciations. Most of the time, the target is Israel, the Jewish state whose nature 
and actions are analogized to villains both historic (such as Nazi Germany, or 
the former apartheid regime in South Africa) and current (like the “Islamic 
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State” terrorist organization, which began a genocidal rampage through Syria 
and northern Iraq during the summer of 2014). This putatively anti-Zionist 
rhetoric often rests upon more established, familiar antisemitic notions, as 
when Jewish communities stand accused, through their continued support for 
Israel, of placing tribal loyalties above fealty to the nations in which they 
live. Furthermore, non-Israel related challenges confronted by diaspora 
Jewish communities—most obviously, the campaign among parliamentarians 
and animal “rights” groups in several European states to outlaw, in the name 
of humanitarianism, essential Jewish rituals such as shechita, the slaughtering 
of animals so that they are fit for kosher consumption, and brit milah, the 
circumcision of eight-day-old male infants in accordance with the Abrahamic 
covenant—summon the ghosts of old and compel the question of why, 
exactly, legislative measures enacted by the Nazi regime are once again being 
proposed in democratic states.3 
 Memory, however, is not always the best guide to the contemporary 
expression of a problem. Hence, the above summary would be sorely com-
promised without an important qualifier. Without making light of the 
persistence of antisemitism in our own time, and without denying that there 
are certain trans-historical antisemitic tropes that we still encounter today, 
such as the longstanding slur in the Islamic world that the Jews are the 
“descendants of apes and pigs,” it is vital that any discussion of contemporary 
antisemitism not be restricted to the realms of ideas and discourse. To 
properly grasp the nature of the threat, our point of departure should begin 
with the material and political status of Jewish communities themselves. For 
it is precisely here that we can appreciate the critical difference between 
present and past: namely, that the Jewish people now are freer and, critically, 
more empowered than at any other time since the American and French 
Revolutions ushered in a new era of representative government at the close of 
the eighteenth century. 
AN AGE OF EMPOWERMENT 
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when modern antisemitism 
crystallized, the Jewish experience of it was defined by three factors: first, the 
existence of discriminatory legislation; second, a marked tendency towards 
mass violence, either sanctioned, or colluded in, by the state and the 
authorities; and third, the absence of Jewish sovereignty, which meant that 
Jews as minority communities were dependent for their security upon the 
states in which they lived. 
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 Those three factors are very hard, though not impossible, to detect in our 
own time. The vast majority of Jews live without antisemitic legislation, and 
with full civil and political rights. To be exact, this status is not completely 
universal. There are smaller Jewish communities living in countries like 
Venezuela, Hungary, Turkey, and Iran, where antisemitic sentiments are 
stoked, or in other ways encouraged, by governments and political leaders. 
And there are regimes who manipulate the charge of antisemitism for their 
own political ends—the most pertinent example can be seen in Vladmir 
Putin’s invocation of right-wing Ukrainian antisemitism as a partial justifi-
cation for the invasion of Ukraine in 2014.4 
 Most significantly, there is a Jewish state that provides sanctuary to Jews 
facing threats to their security. It is a state that is reassuringly capable of 
protecting the Jews who live there, as citizens of Israel, from external 
aggression. Moreover, under the “Law of Return” passed by the Knesset, 
Israel’s parliament, on July 5, 1950, “[E]very Jew has the right to come to 
this country as an oleh”—a Hebrew term for a new Jewish citizen of Israel. 
This measure, perhaps more than any other, represents the link between the 
legacy of the Holocaust and the existential purpose of the State of Israel: to 
ensure that no Jew will, in future, be persecuted on the grounds of ethnicity, 
religious belief, political sympathies, or any of the other pretexts that have 
been mobilized by antisemitic movements. 
 The parameters defining Jewish existence today are not those of a zero-
sum game: empowerment does not eliminate prejudice, nor does prejudice 
render empowerment without significance. In the age of Jewish empower-
ment, then, antisemitism persists with a disarming slipperiness. For some, it 
is frighteningly concrete, a reminder of the observation made by Max Nordau 
to the first Zionist Congress in 1897, that Jewish “emancipation should first 
have been completed in sentiment before it was declared by law.”5 But a 
broad swath of opinion, surveying the transformations of Jewish existence 
brought about after 1945, remains unconvinced that there is a problem to 
begin with; or, if there is one, that it will be resolved once there is a final 
settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is regarded by many as 
the principal cause of global antisemitism. 
 Crucially, the broad empirical truths of Jewish existence now—successful 
integration in democratic societies, in addition to the option of living under 
Jewish sovereignty—have led some analysts to question the continuing 
relevance of “antisemitism” as a descriptor. For example, Anshel Pfeffer, 
widely respected as a level-headed and sober contributor to the liberal Israeli 
daily, Haaretz, wrote in February 2014: 
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Something funny happened to anti-Semitism on the way to the 21st 
century. It stopped being about persecution and open vilification of 
Jews, which was something the goyim did to us and we had no control 
over. It became something we define ourselves, something we dis-
cover and too often invent where it isn’t at all clear it even exists.6 
This statement begs many questions, foremost among them what is defined 
by the word “it.” In that sense, it is helpful to examine the relationship 
between antisemitism in its tangible, physical forms and its intangible, 
ideational, or discursive forms. For while there is little doubt that Jews are the 
target of tangible forms of antisemitism, such as violence, harassment, 
vandalism, and verbal abuse, the grievously polarized debate over its 
intangible forms—in essence, the question of whether or not these and sim-
ilar offenses are underpinned by a negative, hostile Judeocentric world-
view—frequently leads to the conclusion that the Jews of Israel, as a 
sovereign collective, are through their actions reponsible for the misfortunes 
heaped upon Jewish communities in the diaspora. 
 In this schema, therefore, we are facing not antisemitism as classically 
understood—the organization of anti-Jewish sentiment and activism by 
external forces preying on Jewish communities—but something more akin to 
a self-inflicted wound which results in worsening relations with other ethnic 
groups, most prominently the various Muslim and Middle Eastern-origin 
communities in Europe and Latin America. “The sentiment that a large 
section of black and Arab French youth feel towards the Jews is something 
quite different, having nothing in common with historic anti-Semitism,” 
assert the French leftists Alain Badiou, Eric Hazan, and Ivan Segré in 
Reflections on Anti-Semitism. “The hostility of these young people towards 
Jews is fundamentally bound up with what is happening in Palestine. They 
know that, over there, Jewish Israelis are oppressing the Palestinians, whom 
they consider, for obvious historical reasons, as their brothers.”7 
 The influence of this explanation, which recasts antisemitism as anger 
towards the foreign affiliates of a state that was created through the original 
sin of dispossessing the indigenous population, has been registered not only 
in France. Much the same analysis has been applied to other European 
countries, among them Germany, the crucible of the Nazi Holocaust, and the 
United Kingdom, the former mandate power in Palestine. As in France, 
violent episodes elsewhere in Europe accompanied the frosty public response 
to Israel’s decision, in July 2014, to launch its third military response in six 
years to the slew of missile attacks from the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip. 
 In the United Kingdom, where the size of the Jewish population is 
estimated at approximately 300,000, a total of 302 antisemitic incidents were 
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recorded in July 2014, the highest monthly number since the Community 
Security Trust (CST), the official Jewish body handling communal security, 
started keeping records in 1984. Significantly, the CST’s previous highest 
monthly total, 289, was recorded in January 2009, at the height of Operation 
Cast Lead, Israel’s first serious attempt to cancel out the Hamas missile threat 
since withdrawing its forces from the Gaza Strip in 2005.8 Similarly, in 
Germany, where the Jewish population has increased from 30,000 imme-
diately after the Second World War to around 150,000 now, government 
agencies recorded 131 antisemitic incidents in July 2014.9 Given the relative 
size of the respective Jewish and Muslim communities in these two countries, 
Jews are actually much more likely to be targets of hate crimes than are 
Muslims—a trend already observable in France since 2012, when the Service 
de Protection de la Communauté Juive (SPCJ,) the French equivalent of the 
CST, issued a report which noted that 55 percent of racist violence during 
that year was directed at Jews.10 
 This dovetailing of the frequency of antisemitic attacks in Europe with the 
troughs and peaks of the Palestinian conflict with Israel is a major factor 
behind the view that it is Israel’s actions which are the primary cause of 
violence towards Jews. Such an analysis is amplified by the excessive media 
coverage which this conflict attracts, along with the habit of many press and 
broadcast outlets alike to portray Israel’s military response as a deliberate 
attempt to wipe out the basic conditions of existence for the Palestinian 
civilians of Gaza. Empirical research that suggested otherwise, such as that 
conducted by an Israeli think-tank which pointed out the inherent un-
reliability of data on fatalities collected by the Hamas-controlled Health 
Ministry in Gaza, as well as the disproportionately high number of casualties 
among Gazan males of military age, barely dented this viewpoint.11 
 The net effect of this interpretation was to depict attacks on diaspora Jews 
as understandable, if misguided. Any analyst examining the character of 
antisemitism in the early part of the twenty-first century is, sooner or later, 
compelled to ask: is antisemitism these days a phenomenon that is all in the 
mind, the phantom creation of a fevered, historically traumatized collective 
memory? And if the answer to that question is no, then how do we make a 
credible case that rising antisemitism presents a serious challenge to twenty-
first-century civilization? 
CONTESTED DEFINITIONS 
A large part of the problem, as I have indicated already, resides in the fact 
that the term “antisemitism” is the most contested of all the terms in the 
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lexicon of prejudice. When we hear the word “racism,” we generally know 
what is meant, and we understand that it can manifest against people of color 
in different ways. Even “Islamophobia,” a relatively recent term coined by 
Muslim advocacy organizations, enjoys a wide consensus as to its meaning, 
even though that meaning includes forthright critiques of Islam as a faith as 
well as crudely bigoted attitudes towards Muslims. Consider: in the context 
of non-Muslim attitudes towards Muslims, the right to reject religion, the 
right even to engage in blasphemy, an integral right in western societies, is 
now regarded as a form of racism!12 
 But antisemitism is different. To simplify, whereas there is a consensus 
recognition of antisemitism as, historically, a presence in the lives of Jews 
who are now dead, there is no similar consensus recognition of its presence in 
the lives of Jews who are currently alive. 
 Why is this case? I want to suggest two principal reasons. First, the 
perspectives and experiences of minorities who suffer from prejudice tend to 
be privileged in our understanding of how these prejudices function. It is 
generally assumed that if a person of color complains of racism, there is 
likely to be a credible basis for such a claim, or at the very least a recognition 
that we are dealing with a claim that cannot be dismissed out of hand. 
Crucially, minorities “own” the definition of these descriptors, so that we 
automatically infer that the victims of what is called “racism” are people of 
color. This is not always the case with the Jews. With growing frequency, it 
is assumed that the real victims of what is called “antisemitism” are not Jews, 
but those who are unfairly branded as antisemites. 
 This brings me to the second, related, reason: Jews do not own the term 
“antisemitism” in the way that people of color own the term “racism.” 
Indeed, they never have. When the term emerged in Germany in the late 
1870s, its authors proudly described themselves as “antisemites”—a term 
they coined because, they believed, it encapsulated a scientific instead of a 
theological approach to what was known as the “Jewish Question” or the 
“Jewish Problem.” The first generation of antisemites portrayed themselves 
not as prophets of hate and bearers of unreason, but as agents of liberation. 
Under the cover of a discourse of freedom, antisemitism shaped up as a social 
and political program that aimed at the control or outright removal of Jewish 
influence from non-Jewish polities. 
 Within less than a century, however, the term antisemitism was widely 
regarded, including by antisemites themselves, as a term that had outlived its 
usefulness, and moreover one used for the purposes of moral blackmail by 
Jewish and non-Jewish critics of anti-Jewish discourse. These days, we often 
hear anti-Zionists protest that they are accused of antisemitism in order to 
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7 
deflect attention away from their critiques of what they call Israeli, or Zionist, 
apartheid. 
 In fact, this discursive technique is not new. In 1921, in an article for the 
Dearborn Independent on Jewish influence over the American financial 
system, Henry Ford asserted, “It was inevitable that the publication first to 
open the discussion of this Question should be compelled to meet the 
degrading charge of ‘anti-semitism’ and kindred falsehoods.”13 Degrading, 
because for Henry Ford in 1921 as for the former Mayor of London, Ken 
Livingstone, who in 2008 accused his critics of “playing the antisemitism 
card,” the invocation of antisemitism is equivalent to an ad hominem attack. 
It is taken to be a means to demean the substance and focus of a speaker’s 
argument, by portraying him or her as somehow superstitious or irrational or 
motivated by bigoted malice.14 
 All this brings to mind George Orwell’s prescient remark in a 1948 essay, 
that “there is widespread awareness of the prevalence of antisemitic feeling, 
and unwillingness to admit sharing it.”15 Now, it is true that Orwell 
misunderstood several important aspects of antisemitism, such as its relation-
ship to political Zionism. Nonetheless, the above observation of Orwell’s was 
based on his assertion that “above a certain intellectual level, people are 
ashamed of being antisemitic and are careful to draw a distinction between 
‘antisemitism’ and ‘disliking Jews.’” This distinction provides, I would sub-
mit, an ideal entry point into understanding the character of antisemitism in 
our own century. 
ANTISEMITISM AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
However consistent the foundational themes of modern antisemitism may be, 
in our own time we are being sorely tested when it comes to pinpointing the 
agency behind its present resurgence. Consequently, predicting the next steps 
in what Robert Wistrich has described, using the case of France, as the 
“endgame” is a science of the most inexact sort.16 It is not enough to say, as 
many do, that the culprit—in France or in any other country—is “the left,” or 
“nationalist extremism,” or “the Muslims,” or “the internet,” or some com-
bination of these. That is to confuse the multiple, overlapping expressions of 
the problem with the problem itself. 
 Inevitably, this understanding has important consequences for probing 
what antisemitism constitutes in the age of Jewish empowerment. Looked at 
from this perspective, what stands out are not the similarities with the past 
hundred years, but the differences. 
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 Hence, the experiences of the Jews during the last time that a grand ideal 
came crashing down—in this case, the promise of the Enlightenment—can 
sometimes hinder, rather than enable, a nuanced understanding of the current 
predicament. In the twentieth century especially, antisemitism was intimately 
bound up with the ideological imperatives and institutional manifestations of 
totalitarian political movements. True, the themes they summoned may be 
eerily familar to our eyes and ears—we see today the revival of both the Nazi 
image of the Jew as an unctuous predator, and the Soviet image of the Jew as 
a conniving tribalist—but the physical embodiment of the complex of beliefs 
that now compose antisemitism adopts a thoroughly modern (some might say 
“post-modern”) form. 
 In the twentieth century, both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, the 
two states that did more to advance antisemitism than any of their democratic 
peers, converted mob vilification of the Jews into government policy. The 
meshing in these two countries of party and state, and of executive and 
judiciary, under the tutelage of a supreme leader, effectively closed down the 
possibility for autonomous, societally-based, political action. Antisemitism 
was, in this incarnation, a series of gruesome policy measures shaped and 
implemented from on high, even as it struck an agreeable chord with many, 
perhaps even a majority, of non-Jewish subjects. 
 But no European government today directs state-driven antisemitic poli-
cies. Many, in fact, have designed and strengthened legislation in the op-
posite direction, while leaders like German Chancellor Angela Merkel have 
declared: “Jewish life is part of our identity and culture. It hurts me when I 
hear that young Jewish parents are asking if it’s safe to raise their children 
here or the elderly ask if it was right to stay here.”17 In several countries, the 
absence of a constitutional instrument like the First Amendment in the United 
States means that Holocaust denial or even distortion is illegal (among the 
eight convictions which French courts have handed down to Dieudonné 
M’bala M’bala was a 7,000-Euro fine, in June 2008, for referring to 
Holocaust commemorations as “memorial pornography”).18 In the same vein, 
more general hate speech towards Jews can place the offender on the wrong 
side of the law. 
 What all this demonstrates is that however much governments legislate 
and seek to educate against antisemitism, they cannot eliminate it. And the 
reason they cannot do so is that, today, antisemitism thrives within the very 
same democratic spaces that its totalitarian practicioners of yesteryear set 
about eradicating. 
 These limits on government action permit us to grasp the profound change 
in the expression of antisemitism in our century. It is no longer the preserve 
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of a specific political party or state. Rather, antisemitism has broadened its 
appeal and cut across traditional political divisions by becoming a social 
movement. In essence, what was vertical in the last century has become 
horizontal in this one. 
 The term “social movement” is very much a creature of the post-1968, 
New Left-dominated theoretical landscape. In very simple terms, while social 
movements may adopt organizational forms—Greenpeace is a product of 
concerns about the environment, PETA of concerns about the treatment of 
animals—their broader purpose centers more upon the changing of popular 
sensibilities, rather than the creation of enduring political vehicles. To 
identify with a social movement is to adapt one’s beliefs and behavior in 
accordance with the vision set out by the movement in question. A core belief 
(that, say, we are ruining the environment for which we are all responsible) 
leads to material outcomes (eating certain foods and not others, recycling 
renewable materials, avoiding gas-guzzling modes of transportation, and so 
forth.) Once the sum of these individual behaviors reaches critical mass, what 
originally seemed revolutionary and novel becomes established as a social 
norm that can then, in some cases, be enshrined in legislation. As Dietz, 
Abel, Guagnano, and Kalof explain: 
[M]ovement success depends on movement activists and organiza-
tions building support by activating or reshaping personal norms to 
create feelings of obligation. Many social movements, including the 
environmental movement, are aimed at producing public goods that 
are advocated by reference to altruistic values. Such movements work 
to activate personal norms tied to those values. It is also possible, 
however, for a social movement to try to activate personal norms 
based on other kinds of values. For example, some conservative social 
movements, which see traditional values of duty, family loyalty, and 
the like as essential for providing public goods such as social order, 
refer to these values in attempting to activate feelings of personal 
obligation to support movement objectives.19 
 What, then, is the core belief of antisemitism in its guise as a social move-
ment? What is the grand idea that enables the coming together of disparate, 
contradictory, political forces—the extreme left, neo-fascists, Islamists, even 
large numbers of liberals—in common cause? In my view, it centers upon op-
position towards the notion of Jewish national self-determination and 
suspicion of collective Jewish political efforts—the dreaded “communi-
tarisme,” or “communalism,” identified by Robert Wistrich in the French 
situation.20 Put another way, the very real, empirically-verifiable empower-
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ment of the Jews in the post-1945 era is regarded as a profoundly negative 
development with global implications. 
 The embrace of this overarching idea, whether in the name of the 
“Palestinians,” the “people,” the “umma,” or the “nation,” has generated 
common, standardized rhetoric and behavior. To begin with, those who detest 
Jewish “communalism” usually detest the term “antisemitism” for the same 
reason, regarding it as a device to censor discussions of the Zionist present by 
invoking the sufferings of the Jewish past. “The word ‘antisemitic,’” as 
Badiou, Hazan, and Segré insist, “is not only the most violent choice, but also 
the one with the least bearing on the present reality.”21 
 Then there is the tendency to elevate the Palestinian cause—a local 
struggle not dissimilar from the myriad other national conflicts in the world 
today—into what might be called the ideology of “Palestinianism.” From this 
vantage point, the Palestinians become iconic, transcendental victims, rather 
like the Jews were for a brief period after the Second World War. Those who 
kneel before the altar of Palestinian suffering with almost spiritual fervor can 
be relied on to traffic in the kinds of themes that have now gained a foothold 
in mainstream discourse: that Israel, the Jewish state, is a carbon copy of 
South Africa’s old apartheid regime, that it consciously mimics the practices 
of the Nazis, that it is—as formulated in the perverse Twitter hashtag 
#JSIL—a Jewish reflection of the Islamic State terrorist gang that has raped, 
murdered, enslaved and decapitated thousands of innocents in Syria and Iraq. 
 Because we are dealing with a social movement, there are no restrictions 
of education, or ethnicity (appropriately anti-Zionist Jews can participate, 
thereby assisting the wider movement in deflecting charges of antisemitism) 
or social class, or political affiliation, when it comes to getting involved. 
Similarly, there are no requirements to pay membership dues, or sell publi-
cations, or any of the drab imperatives that characterized earlier generations 
of political activism. Instead, the emphasis is on spectacle.Supporters of the 
Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement are increasingly prone 
to raiding supermarkets and forcibly removing Israeli goods from the shelves, 
filming themselves as they do so and displaying the results on blogs, websites 
and other social media platforms. Young people, especially, can make a 
statement by photographing themselves performing the “quenelle,” the 
inverted Nazi salute popularized by Dieudonné, and posting the image online; 
as Dave Rich observed in an article about the quenelle phenomenon, “this 
may be the first individualist mass movement of the social media age.”22 
Through such practices, slowly but surely, what was once taboo becomes 
normalized for large sections of the population. 
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 And “normalization”—a word, ironically, that is associated with Zionist 
political thought—is precisely what antisemitism as a social movement seeks 
to achieve. The aim is to persuade the mass of people to reflexively shun 
Israel in the same manner that they would once have shunned South Africa’s 
ruling white minority, and to overturn the comparatively philosemitic mood 
that settled upon Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War in favor 
of the genuine victims: the Palestinians. 
 The primary target of twenty-first-century antisemitism, therefore, centers 
upon opposition to real, tangible Jewish power, the clearest illustration of 
which is the State of Israel. Hence, one of the reasons that the anti-Zionist, 
eliminationist agenda of the BDS movement can legitimately be described as 
antisemitic is that, in its quest to quarantine the State of Israel as an initial 
stage towards its eventual dismantling, diaspora Jewish communities are 
weakened through a process of guilt by association, while the Jewish state is 
cast as a rogue state par excellence. Were this trajectory to be carried to a 
successful conclusion, the net result would be to restore the status quo ante, 
by disempowering the Jews through the abolition of Jewish sovereignty. 
 The organizationally loose, politically promiscuous nature of antisemitism 
as a social movement raises many questions, but none are more vexing than 
this one: what will its ultimate effect be? As I have argued, today’s Jews are 
not living in a rebirth of the year 1933, nervously awaiting the rise to power 
of antisemitic political party with an antisemitic manifesto (although, of 
course, such parties, like Jobbik in Hungary and Golden Dawn in Greece, 
remain in existence and represent an important threat.) 
 Instead, we are compelled to focus on more intangible factors, like the 
prevailing political atmosphere, or what we see and read in the media, or the 
chilling anecdotes we hear from friends and relatives in cities like Stockholm 
and Antwerp, Santiago and Buenos Aires. Jews feel fear, but they are not 
entirely sure what it is that they are fearful of. Increased violence? Legalized 
discrimination? The requirement, in order to maintain safety, to hide visible 
expressions of Judaism like the wearing of a yarmulkeh? Expulsion? 
Genocide? 
 Perhaps it is none of these; social movements can be fickle, and 
antisemitism is no exception. As Dave Rich argued in relation to the quenelle 
phenomenon, the movement’s ad-hoc nature is also emblematic of its 
political failure: “this is a mass movement of attitude rather than action, 
which so far has not translated into formal political power.”23 Perhaps Jews 
are fated to live at the mercy of the news cycle, dependent on each 
degeneration of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians over the 
existence of the Jewish state leading to periodic outrages, such as those of 
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July 2014, which leave the nagging sense that they would be better off 
elsewhere. 
 It is often quipped that European governments have a decent record of 
commemorating dead Jews, as evidenced by the numerous Holocaust memo-
rials across the continent, and a more sobering record when it comes to 
protecting live ones. Even if Europe’s leaders cannot, as I have argued here, 
legislate antisemitism out of existence, they can make a decisive contribution 
to combating it by acknowledging explicitly that the continent’s culture of 
Israel-hatred—expressed through boycott campaigns, degrading films and 
cartoons, the analogizing of Israel with states past and present engaged in 
endemic human rights abuse—is what lies behind the latest embrace of “the 
longest hatred.” To do so will not be easy, as it will require the balancing of 
policy imperatives both domestic (the continuing challenge of integrating 
Muslim communities) and foreign. This especially applies to Europe’s desire 
to avoid being sucked into the sectarian wars waged by Iran and other powers 
in the Middle East, powers that are only too ready to traffic in antisemitism. 
Given the grip that the Palestinian narrative of suffering already exercises on 
the European liberal conscience, we would be wise not to expect too much. 
NOTES 
1. See Cnaan Liphshitz, “In riot outside synagogue, French Jews were left to 
protect themselves,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 18 July 2014. 
2. “After Five Attacks, Dutch Chief Rabbi Binyomin Jacobs Ponders Future,” 
Forward, 6 Aug. 2014. 
3. “European Jewish officials defend ritual circumcision,” Times of Israel, 30 
Jan. 2014. 
4. “Putin Says Ukraine’s Revolutionaries Are Anti-Semites. Is He Right?” 
Time Magazine, 6 Mar. 2014. 
5. Max Nordau, “Speech to the First Zionist Congress,” in The Zionist Idea, 
edited by A. Herzberg (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1997), 236. 
6. Anshel Pfeffer, “The New Antisemitism Is Whatever Israelis Want It To 
Be,” Haaretz, 7 Feb. 2014. 
7. A. Badiou, E. Hazan, I. Segré, Reflections on Anti-Semitism (New York: 
Verso, 2013), 13. 
8. “Anti-Jewish Incidents at Record High in Britain,” Jerusalem Post, 7 Sept. 
2014. 
9. “Germany’s Merkel Vows to Fight Anti-Semitism,” Haaretz, 14 Sept. 2014. 
10.  SPCJ, Report on Antisemitism in France 2012, 10. Available at http:// 
dl.antisemitisme.org/REPORT%202012.pdf. 
11. See “Examination of the Names of Palestinians killed in Operation 
Protective Edge,” Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, http:// 
www.terrorism-info.org.il/. 
Buy the Book

		
		
 

X *66X#1LO>HX'6L6NVX+=6XHR6HN>IHXI7DMC1FIK=I2>1X(,"&,X 1H
X

X

X 6HLUX IL4X  6S>M=X H:EP6H36MX >HX F6L>31HX ">76X X 1R1>C12C6X 1NX
=NOKM1L3=>R6X
IL<MNL61F@6S>M=>H:EP6H36MX461LPI9-@6S>M=>H:EP6H36MX461LQI;X0X5AX
RP
NTN
X

X 1R>4X >LM=X 33PM1N>IHMX I7X F1C>3>IPMX >HN6HNX >HX 4621N6MX 12IPNX N=6X
'1C6MN>H6ML16CX 3IH:E>3NX 1H4X 12IPNX 1HN>M6F>N>MFX +=6X ">R>H<MNIH6X ILFPC1N>IHX
KC1U>H<X N=6X1HN>M6F>N>MFX31L4X1H4X3IHN6MN>H<XN=6X2IPH41L>6MXI7X1HN>L13>MNX4>M3IPLM6X
#$'#$,X1R1>C12C6X1NX=NOK6H<1<6IHC>H6
:?C6M
SIL4KL6MM
3IFX
0NL1HMR6LM1C0XX%X0XX0>HH6HN6>C0X26>NL1<0X=>LM3=
K47
X

X &LS6CCMX K>636X 6HN>NC64X HN>*6F>N>MFX >HX L>N1>HX S1MX :?LMNX KP2C>M=64X GX
KL>CX X 2UX N=6X !%"!##), 	($, !#, NX >MX L6KP2C>M=64X >HX $$)$,
R6LUF1HX">2L1LUXX	
X

X )I26LNX />MNL>3=X *PFF6LX >HX '1L>MX #IM1>3X #1<1W>H6X &3N
X X
=NNKFIM1>3F1<1W>H6
3IF6MM1UCXMPFF6L>HK1L>M
X

 6LF1HUMX#6LB6CX.ISMXNIX><=NXHN>*6F>N>MFX#%+,X*6KN
X


 #1>1X46XC1X1PF6XXL6H3=X 6MN6LX/=IX+L146MX>HX1N6X(,!#,$,
X PH6X
X

X +
X>6NVX +
X26CX
XP1<H1HIX"
!1CI7XX.1CP66C>68$ILFX +=6ILUX I7X
*PKKILNX :JLX *I3>1CX #IR6F6HNMX +=6X 1M6X I7X HR>LIHF6HN1C>MFX&, !!*,
'(,XHI
XX
X

 />MNL>3=X*PFF6LX>HX'1L>M


 14>IPX6NX1CX%!$,!,%%$,


 1R6X)>3=X +=6X,HS6C3IF6XLL>R1CX I7X N=6X (P6H6CC6X$$%,
+ ,
X 1H
X
X

X 2>4

Buy the Book
